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Abstract
Complex IT projects pose particular challenges for the application of control, because of the
dynamism and uncertainty involved. Prior studies suggest self-control can complement formal
control within complex projects. However, how managers can enact controlee self-control remains
an unsolved question. This paper proposes and investigates how enacted formal control unfolds
during the course of an IT project and, in particular, how formal control enactment can promote or
hinder controlee self-control. We demonstrate through case studies of a control in two wireless
communication product development projects that an enabling control style can induce controlees to
act to the benefit of both the controller and the controlee, while an authoritative control style
encourages controlees’ self-interested behavior. We also show how controlees influence the
enactment of control within complex projects and demonstrate the reinforcing effects of the
controller’s enactment and controlee response on project outcomes. For practice, this research
identifies preconditions necessary for inducing controlee self-control.
Keywords: Formal Control, Self-Control, Control Enactment, Control Style, Controlee Response
Jens Dibbern was the accepting senior editor. This research article was submitted on July 25, 2016, and underwent
seven revisions.

1

Introduction

When complex projects are initiated, there is often no
precise vision of the resulting product/system and no
detailed specifications of the project tasks or a clear
route to achieve project goals (Ahern, Leavy, & Byrne,
2014; Baccarini, 1996; Tatikonda & Rosenthal, 2000).
New product development integrating new software and
hardware is one form of complex project. Technology
solutions of this type, such as internet of things (IoT)
solutions (e.g., networked wireless communication
products) are becoming commonplace. Such complex
IT projects require the adoption of control practices
from both product development as well as IS
development (Tarafdar & Tanriverdi, 2018).
Controlee self-control is particularly important for such
complex IT projects. Controlee self-control allows the
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“man on the spot” (i.e., the controlee) (Hayek, 1945, p.
524) to make decisions that cannot be addressed by
prespecified controls. However, how managers can
enact controlee self-control remains an unsolved
question. Increasingly, empirical evidence suggests
formal control is somehow related to controlee selfcontrol (Grabski & Leech, 2007; Gulati & Puranam,
2009; Henderson & Lee, 1992; Huber, Fischer, Dibbern,
& Hirschheim, 2013; Tiwana & Keil, 2009; Wiener et
al., 2016). For example, in the context of 79 internal IS
projects, Tiwana and Keil (2009) noted that both formal
control (behavior control) and self-control contribute to
effective project performance; Grabski and Leech (2007)
found formal control and self-control statistically
interact to explain the success of an internal IS project.
However, the actual processual relationship between the
two modes of control remains unknown (Gopal &
Gosain, 2010; Tiwana, 2010). Often, controllers rely on
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selection/recruitment processes to choose controlees
who have the abilities and knowledge to exercise selfcontrol (e.g., through screening or performance
evaluation processes) (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003;
Kirsch et al., 2002). We argue that part of the answer lies
in the way that formal control is enacted.
An enacted view of control sees control enacted by the
controller as an ongoing process (Orlikowski & Iacono,
2000). It is through the control enactment and controlee
response that control comes into existence. One key
aspect of control enactment is the controller control style,
i.e., the manner by which controllers exercise their
authority to shape controlees’ experience of control (vs.
the control itself that regulates controlees’ behaviors)
(Wiener et al., 2016). This paper studies such formal
control enactment in a comparative case study of two
wireless communication product development projects
(i.e., IoT solutions) in which a newly implemented
formal control (i.e., a checklist) was enacted in distinct
ways, leading to distinct controlee responses.
In many complex projects, it is impossible to a priori
specify all necessary controlee behaviors—there are
often situational contingencies specific to the project
that might possibly happen and cause problems (i.e., the
situational contingency-formal control gap). These
contingencies may arise from a project’s environment
and/or structures and procedures employed in a project
(Engwall, 2003). Clearly, to achieve controller goals, it
is necessary to address situational contingencies. This
paper’s principal contribution is a process model
showing how the controller’s different enactment of a
formal control encourages particular controlee
responses and vice versa, ultimately leading to the gap
between the situational contingencies and formal control
either being bridged by controlee self-control or being
exploited for controlees’ self-protection purpose only.
The model explains how formal control can lead to
controlee self-control, by highlighting the importance of
an enactment of formal control in an enabling style (as
opposed to an authoritative one). Enacting control in an
enabling style involves the provision to controlees of
contingent information (i.e., transparency) and the right
to make decisions (i.e., repair). This creates a safe space
and a collaborative culture for controlees to take
independent, creative actions. When unspecified issues
emerge, the controlee is able to exercise self-control to
experiment with new behaviors to resolve these issues,
leading to the situational contingency-formal control
gap being bridged. Conversely, controlee self-control
does not arise when formal controls are enacted in an
authoritative style to the point where maladaptation and
tension result. Here, the controlee attempts to protect
him- or herself by performing behaviors the controlee
feels will minimize punishment, rather than exploring
new behaviors to address issues. The model provides
practical recommendations for the controller to facilitate
controlee self-control.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter
2, we review the relevant literature on organizational
control and an enacted view of control. We continue
with a description of the methodology in Chapter 3. Our
findings are presented in Chapter 4, followed by a
discussion in Chapter 5. Finally, some limitations to this
study are noted and conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.

2

Background Literature

The study of control has a long history in organization
studies (Braverman, 1974; Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1979,
1980). However, most research has focused on control
in routine and permanent organizations (Wiener et al.,
2016). One important contribution of contemporary IS
research is to adapt the organization control literature to
the nonroutine and temporary context of IS projects,
leading to behavioral control theory (Choudhury &
Sabherwal, 2003; Chua, Lim, Soh, & Sia, 2012; Kirsch,
1997; Mähring, 2002; Wiener, Remus, Heumann, &
Mähring, 2015).
Within behavioral control theory, control refers to any
attempt by a controller to ensure that a controlee acts
according to predefined strategies to achieve
organizational objectives (Kirsch, 1997). Researchers
have identified two principal modes of control, formal
and informal control. Formal control relies on the
controller’s hierarchical authority to monitor, evaluate
and reward the controlee. There are three “sub” modes
of formal control: input, behavior (process) and outcome
(output) control (Eisenhardt, 1985; Govindarajan &
Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996, 1997; Ouchi, 1979; Wiener
et al., 2016). Input control involves the management of
human, financial and material project resources
allocated by the controller. The controlee is rewarded or
punished for his/her ability to utilize those resources.
Behavior control prescribes rules and procedures. The
controlee is rewarded or punished, depending on how
faithfully procedures are followed. Outcome control
prescribes the desired outcomes or goals and the
controlee is rewarded/punished for meeting/failing
goals.
Informal control is noted by the absence of the use of
hierarchical authority to monitor, evaluate and reward.
There are likewise two “sub” modes of informal control,
clan and self-control (Jaworski, 1988; Kirsch, 1996;
Kirsch & Cummings, 1996; Ouchi, 1980). Clan control
and its equivalents of “cultural control,” “normative
control,” (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011; Kunda, 1992) or
“concertive control” (Barker, 1993) refer to
proscriptions of behavior based on norms, ceremonies,
and shared experiences, with particular significance
placed on emotional relations of unity and solidarity
with the organization or colleagues (Alvesson &
Kärreman, 2007; Costas, 2012; Ouchi, 1980). Clan
control works by socializing controlees to common
norms or values (Ouchi, 1980). The “power source” of
formal and clan control is external to the self. Controlees

313

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

are regulated either through the application of
hierarchical authority (i.e., formal control) or
institutions, or norms (i.e., clan control). Self-control, in
contrast, refers to proscriptions of behavior managed by
the self. It is commonly understood to be self-chosen
and carries the connotations of individualism and selfactualization (Maruping, Venkatesh, & Agarwal, 2009;
Ryan & Deci, 2000b; Wiener et al., 2015).
Substantive research has been done on formal control in
organizations (Gopal & Gosain, 2010; Gregory & Keil,
2014; Heumann et al., 2015; Keil et al., 2014; Wiener et
al., 2016). An increasing stream of research has
acknowledged the risks associated with excessive
formal control (e.g., operating delays, bureaucratic
inefficiency, adaptive limits) and the need to leverage
the unique strengths of informal control (Huber et al.,
2013; Lioliou et al., 2014). Recent studies demonstrate
that formal control can be enacted to induce clan control
by creating/leveraging social capital (Chua et al., 2012;
Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 2010). However, research results
on the interplay between formal and self-control are
sparse and inconclusive. Some suggest that formal
control impedes self-control because formal control
signals a lack of trust (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Others
argue that formal control can facilitate self-control by
increasing interaction for building trust (Huber et al.,
2013) or clarifying project boundaries (Kirsch &
Cummings, 1996). There is a need for more in-depth
research explaining how formal control unfolds and
relates to self-control. We aim to fill this gap by studying
the way control is enacted.

2.1 An Enacted View of Control
By enacting a control, we mean bringing it into
existence by means of action (Weick, 1995). Control is
not merely a mechanism selected and implemented by
the controller. Controlee action is also essential for
realizing the potential of the selected control toward the
fulfillment of controller goals (i.e., goals the controller
wants to achieve through implementation of control).
Control is thus an ongoing production by both the
controller and controlee (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2000).
The resulting outcome is essentially the product of both
the controller’s (control enactment) and controlee’s
making (controlee response) (Chua & Myers, 2018;
Weick, 1995).
When controllers enact controls, they set or clarify rules,
define the conditions for the controlee to act in, and
employ a specific vocabulary of motives. For example,
given a standard operating procedure (SOP), an
employee may perform a task incorrectly and receive a
verbal reprimand. This reprimand can take a number of
forms. The controller could denigrate the controlee
without clarifying the fault and threaten the controlee
with severe punishment if any deviation happens again.
Alternately, the controller could explain the fault and
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encourage the controlee to propose improvements to the
SOP. In both cases, the same control is employed, but
the control is enacted differently. Indeed, the controller
can enact a control to create positive (e.g., clarification
of rules) or negative (e.g., psychological distress)
conditions for controlee task performance.
Likewise, the control enacted by a controller does not
fully determine a controlee’s actions (Chua & Myers,
2018). When the controller enacts a control, he or she
creates a space in which the controlee can perform an
action. The controlee’s response could be one of a range
of possibilities, which creates consequences that are
intended or unintended by the controller. Continuing
with the same example, as a result of the verbal
reprimand, the controlee could choose to be more
careful (i.e., intended by the controller), or could feel
resentful and deliberately sabotage work in a way that
could not be traced to him or her (i.e., unintended by the
controller) (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).

2.2 A Preliminary Analytical Model
To account for the aforementioned duality between
control enactment and controlee response, a temporal
model is required for structuring the process. When a
controller enacts a new control, this causes changes to
extant patterns of action. The full implications of these
changes are not immediate, as controlees need to
reinterpret the situation and respond (Van de Ven &
Poole, 1995). Furthermore, the actual outcomes of these
changes may be uncertain (Merton, 1936). We therefore
model the enactment process sequentially, without
presuming any specific progressive developmental logic
(Barley, 1986; Langley, 1999). Figure 1 presents our
theorization of the relationship between control
enactment and controlee response. In the figure, the
enactment of formal control occurs in temporal episodes
(E1, E2, E3, etc.). Both the controller’s enactment and
the controlee’s response shape the context.
The controller’s enactment shapes the context, because
the control itself is now part of the context. Both the
controller and controlee must make future decisions
based on the existence of this control. For example, a
controller offers a $1 bounty for every bug found in
someone else’s code. This, however, leads to collusion
among developers who deliberately insert easy-to-find
bugs in their code so that everyone gets the bounty. The
controller then has to enact new controls in this new
context, for example, by declaring that in instances
where there are more than 10 bugs per module, the
developer who created the bug has to pay the bounty.
Control thus presents the controller and controlee with
opportunities to reciprocally shape their context. The
variety of ways through which the controller may enact
formal control and the controlee may respond to control
enactment under evolving contextual situations is the
focus of our analysis.
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Figure 1. A Preliminary Analytical Model

2.2.1 Control Enactment
The controller can choose to emphasize formal control
through the use of threats or sanctions, or through
choice and feedback (Deci & Ryan, 1987). The way
the controller enacts control can shape controlees’
psychological reaction (Steinberg, 2005) and attitudes
toward a control (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). This in turn
shapes their behaviors. The controller can enact control
in two distinct styles: enabling and authoritative
(Wiener et al., 2016), representing the two extreme
ends of a continuum. The enabling style, and similar
styles of “responsible autonomy” (Friedman, 1990)
and “quasi-autonomous pattern” (Alvesson &
Willmott, 2002), recognizes that the controlee is
intelligent and that not all tasks are programmable.
Therefore, when adopting the enabling style, the
controller focuses on mobilizing the controlee’s
capacity to exercise discretion to attain controller goals.
In contrast, the authoritative style, and its similar styles
of “direct control” (Friedman, 1990) and “managerial
pattern” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), is top-down,
unyielding, and punitive (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).
The focus of the authoritative style is on controlee
compliance through detailed specification of tasks and
close supervision.
Two features distinguish the enabling from the
authoritative style, namely transparency and repair
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Wiener et al., 2016). In
transparency, information about control activities and
the context are provided to controlees to develop their
understanding as to how formal control facilitates
controller goals and how their tasks relate to these
goals (Adler & Borys, 1996). However, instead of
having information randomly pushed toward the

controlee, the information is made available on
demand and is made intelligible to the controlee. For
example, the controller makes available related
information on a shared server and categorizes it to
make it easy for controlees to navigate (e.g., by
organizing Excel worksheets in temporal order). In
contrast, controllers that adopt the authoritative style
treat controls as assertive instructions or prescriptions,
keeping information about the context and control
activities from controlees (Wiener et al., 2016).
Information distributed by
authoritative-style
controllers is meant to determine and structure
controlee behavior and put constraints on controlee
judgment (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). For example,
a controller issues a policy and takes away controlees’
rights to challenge it.
Repair is concerned with deviations and breakdowns
in control activities. A controller adopting the enabling
style anticipates breakdowns and appreciates the
controlee’s potential contribution to repair them. The
enabling style views formal control as an imperfect
tool for achieving controller goals. The controlee is
given discretion to disregard control when judgment is
required (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Hoy & Sweetland,
2001; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). For example,
when controlees realize that a requirement is more
complex than anticipated, they discuss changes to the
project schedule with the controller. In contrast,
authoritative-style controllers anticipate no deviations
and fear controlee opportunism more than their
potential contribution to fix breakdowns; they enact
control to ensure compliance under all circumstances
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Ashforth, 1997; Cooper &
Taylor, 2000). For example, a controlee is penalized if
he or she is unable to make a deadline even though the
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issue concerning the requirement is more complex than
initially estimated. In the authoritative style, threats
and sanctions are frequently used to minimize
deviations (Huebner, 2003).

2.2.2 Controlee Response
Given the enacted control, the controlee can choose to
embrace the goals intended by the control (i.e., a
precursor to self-control) or can consider such goals to
be external and separate from the controlee’s goals.
External control means controlees perform an activity
because they feel external pressure to perform the
activity (e.g., formal control, clan control). They have
no intrinsic desire to perform the activity. When a
controlee responds to controls as external, the
controlee expends relatively little capacity (e.g.,
energy, cognitive resources) to execute commands
because the controller or peer is charged with setting
the goals or rules, monitoring the controlee’s
performance, and taking actions to reward or punish
the controlee. In contrast, self-control requires a
controlee to set his or her own goals, monitor the
difference between the actual state and the goals, and
take actions to close the gap accordingly (Baumeister,
2002; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; de Ridder et al.,
2012; Vohs et al., 2014). Self-control comprises three
factors: self-goal setting, self-monitoring, and intrinsic
motivation (Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996; Kirsch, 1996; Kirsch & Cummings,
1996).
Self-goals are the desired outcomes or ideals set up by
the controlee (Baumeister, 2002). The goals can direct
attention, mobilize efforts, increase persistence and
motivate personal action toward goals not prescribed
by the controller (Latham & Locke, 1991). For
example, an employee wants to achieve a certain
standard of performance because this would give them
a positive feeling. While goals are usually set up by the
controller, the controlee can internalize or derive
higher goals from said controller goals. For example, a
project member decides to submit deliverables earlier
than required by management. At the workplace, a
defined performance standard, quota (the amount of
work or production), time limit, or budget for
completing a task can influence a controlee’s goals and
become internalized.
Self-monitoring involves systematic information
gathering about one’s own behavior and comparing the
actual state with the ideal standard. For example, office
workers attempting to achieve a specified level of
energy saving must monitor their own energy
consumption patterns (Yun et al., 2013). Selfmonitoring is critical to self-control because it allows
the controlee to obtain important information for the
regulation of personal behavior (Baumeister, 2002;
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Miller, 1987).
Substantial empirical work has demonstrated the
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necessity of self-monitoring. For example, the failure
to monitor posture while performing typing tasks or
assembly tasks means that safe posturing does not
occur (Gravina et al., 2008). Similarly, when forklift
drivers failed to monitor their performance, time spent
on-task increased (Ludwig & Goomas, 2009).
Intrinsic motivation is the most important element of
self-control (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Manz,
1986; Manz & Sims Jr., 1987). To be motivated means
to be moved to do something. Without motivation,
self-goal setting and self-monitoring are insufficient
for inducing self-control. Motivation can be either
intrinsic or extrinsic (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Intrinsic
motivation exists when tasks are interesting, enjoyable,
or satisfy the innate psychological need of competence
(Harter, 1978), autonomy or relatedness (Baumeister
& Leary, 1995). Nidumolu and Subramani (2003)
found that intrinsic motivation facilitated self-control
in software developers. Extrinsic motivation occurs
when performing a request allows a person to obtain a
separable outcome, such as to satisfy an external
demand or obtain some reward (Ryan & Deci, 2000a).

2.2.3 Context
Controllers and controlees are embedded in a context
that has other preexisting controls (Choudhury &
Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 1997). These other controls
along with noncontrol factors (e.g., parallel events,
organizational politics, institutionalized routines)
constitute the context that shapes and is shaped by the
controller’s and controlee’s actions.
First, there is a conglomeration of controls of different
origins and disparate ages in the organization. While
some may be tailored to a specific task, others originate
from separate functions or professional communities.
While some endure for a long time, others are only
enacted for a brief duration (e.g., the life of the project).
For example, the employee’s employment contract and
dictates from the human resources department all
influence controlee behavior. If existing controls align
with controller goals, there is a strong probability that
controlee behaviors will likewise align with these
goals. If not, inefficiency, conflicts of interest, and
confusion about the contradiction between what these
controls dictate and actual behavioral patterns on the
part of the controlee will probably exist. It is also likely
that the controller can improve the situation by
removing or relaxing some controls or the controlee
can resist or work around the controls.
Second, there are many noncontrol factors that occur
simultaneously with control enactment and controlee
response (e.g., other projects) (Engwall, 2003), or that
accumulate from prior interaction (e.g., trust) (Huber
et al., 2013). These factors require resources and
energy to deal with and sometimes produce outputs of
little utility or even negative consequences. For
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example, a controlee tasked to work on project A might
be distracted by his work on project B, especially if
project B is late. In other words, project B drains the
controlee’s energy and motivation to work on project
A. However, the controller can help conserve the
controlee’s energy by rescheduling project B or
allocating extra resources.

organization in two distinct ways. In one project, the
controller enacted formal control to enable staff to
exercise self-control, benefiting both the controller and
controlee; in the other, the controller enacted the
control to prompt controlee action. However, enacted
controlee action was only for the purpose of selfprotection.

Clearly, control can become outdated and fail in
changing circumstances. Control can thus impede
performance and can cause negative feelings such as
stress or alienation (Chua & Myers, 2018). Yet selfcontrolled controlees will take the initiative to set selfgoals that are aligned with controller goals and monitor
said goals, regardless of situational contingencies.
Self-control can thus complement formal control to
address any project-specific situation for achieving
controller goals. We refer to the possibility that formal
control can misspecify behavior in specific situations
as the situational contingency-formal control gap. This
gap can be potentially bridged by self-control.

3.1 Site Description and the
Manufacturability Readiness Review

3

Methodology

To develop a process model about control enactment,
we followed an exploratory multiple-case research
approach (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin,
2003). This is an incremental, theory-building
approach where researchers generate and augment
insights about control enactment by iterating between
theory and data. We entered the field with the
preliminary model and constructs in Figure 1. The first
researcher was engaged in collecting data about the
two cases and theorizing; the second researcher carried
on with the theorizing but did not participate in data
collection. Incidents in each case were constantly
compared with each other, between the two cases, and
with theory.
In this study, the same control mechanism was applied
to two product development projects in the same

The study was conducted at a large manufacturer
(hereinafter designated as MassCo). MassCo designs
and manufactures wireless communication products
that embed both software and hardware to develop new
product features/functionality (e.g., TV boxes that
stream video on demand). Thus, software engineering
was a critical element of each product. Its headquarters
are in Taiwan and it has production sites across Asia.
MassCo employs about 1500 employees worldwide
and has six major business units. Given the distribution
of manufacturing sites in Asia, a manufacturing center
(hereinafter called “the Center”) was established to
coordinate and control production. The two product
development projects studied were part of the Center,
comprising 45 engineers (e.g., mechanical engineers,
product engineers) working in an open-plan office.
These engineers had undergone distinct training
associated with their areas of specialization. Engineers
also tended to work on specific product lines.
Therefore, the same groups of engineers tended to work
together over time, being responsible for separate issues
associated with production planning and pilot
production of new products. Apart from formal control,
the engineers had professional autonomy based on their
collective or individual competence. Their daily
routines required that they make many “judgment calls”
(mechanical engineer, Project Beta) to deal with issues
emerging from the shop floor.

Table 1. The MRR’s Major Functions in Different Technical Areas
Technical area

Description

Product design

Guides engineers through the process of verifying/testing product design, both hardware and
software (e.g., PCB assembly, mechanical assembly, and underlying software programs).

Machinery

Guides engineers through the process of programming for process automation and reviewing
equipment and fixtures needed, including their capacity, availability, and performance.

Workmanship

Guides engineers through the process of reviewing manpower needed (e.g., operators,
maintenance technicians, training)

Materials

Guides engineers through the process of reviewing materials needed, e.g., PCBs, electronic parts,
mechanical parts, packing materials, etc.

Production procedures

Guides engineers through the process of verifying/testing standard operating procedures.

Routine reports

Generates reports of pilot production outcomes in tabular/chart format.
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Controller
Product engineer (a
senior technical manager
in Project Alpha)

Designers

Engineers
(Controlee)

Offshore factory

Note: Bold fonts indicate major actors during the pilot production stage.

Figure 2. Chart of Project Organization During Pilot Production
It is often the case that poor performance tends to
encourage the controller to enact more controls
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). In an attempt to raise
the yield rates (i.e., ratio of good units produced) of new
products at MassCo, a new control was enacted called
the Manufacturability Readiness Review (MRR) for the
purpose of better control over the pilot production
process. This took the form of a checklist with multiple
worksheets encapsulated in a Microsoft Excel
workbook designed to verify production- and designrelated problems. The MRR was both an outcome and
behavior control. It aimed at regulating the pilot
production outputs (e.g., yield rates) and activities
associated with generic design/production requirements
of all products at MassCo. The MRR was arranged in
temporal order with items on the same worksheets that
could be executed simultaneously. The controller could
easily reorganize the checklist for information
processing/transmission. Table 1 lists the major MRR
functions in different technical areas.
At MassCo, most production issues, including those
related to materials and production procedures were
specified by designers in the bills of materials (BOM)
and preliminary SOP. The engineers then applied their
technical skills to perform routine checks. One intent of
the MRR was to increase engineers’ early participation
in product analysis by requiring them to audit product
design, including both hardware and software and “their
integration” (surface mount technology engineer,
Project Alpha). The product design function required
engineers to apply in-depth domain knowledge to detect
design errors early to reduce modification and
production cost. For example, items on the checklist
about the position of components (e.g., angles or
distance from other components, or external covers)
were introduced to encourage engineers to use their
judgment to prevent undesired outcomes, such as
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damage to or interference with other components,
unstable assembly, or even functional failure. Items
about software testing (e.g., associated parameters,
versions, procedures, hardware support/deployment)
were also included to allow engineers to better manage
the process and identify causes of execution failure (e.g.,
software bugs, testing methods, or hardware design).
The idea was that the engineer could compare pilot
production preparation against an MRR item, and then
check off each item after the process was executed.
Once all processes were executed, the MRR was passed
to one of MassCo’s production sites for volume
production. The MRR checklist was linked to engineers’
annual appraisals. If a project resulted in volume
production problems and the engineer failed to execute
and check off corresponding items, that engineer could
not be higher than the 60th percentile in performance
evaluations.

3.1.1 Control Relationship
New product development at MassCo followed a
sequential process, with the product engineer taking
control once the project entered the pilot production
stage. Generally, product engineers were charged with
overseeing production (including pilot production) to
meet an overall schedule set by the project manager and
performance indicators by the Center. The MRR thus
was the most comprehensive of many controls that the
product engineer could apply to monitor the project.
Figure 2 depicts various stakeholders in a product
development project and their formal relationships as
controllers and controlees. During the pilot production
stage, the major actors included the engineer (controlee),
and product engineer (controller) who directly
controlled the engineer or mediated the influence of
other controllers on the engineer. In Project Alpha, the
controller was a senior technical manager.

The Reinforcing Effects of Formal Control Enactment

3.2 Data Collection
The first author was invited to study the MRR adoption
by the Center director. She entered the field site in May,
about five months after the MRR rollout, and stayed
until November 2009 to collect retrospective data. The
first author visited the field at fortnightly intervals and
stayed for half a day or longer to collect data on each
visit. Because the MRR was mainly associated with
three engineering functions, the first author focused on
getting information from these three engineering
sections (i.e., surface mount technology, mechanical
engineering, and product engineering). The senior
technical manager who led the first project (Project
Alpha) suggested it as a case study to the first author.
Data about how control enactment unfolded in Project
Alpha was collected within one month of its
completion. As data collection continued, the theme of
self-control emerged, as we noticed the engineers
voluntarily monitored their own performance and set
challenging goals for themselves.
To extend and test our understanding of how and why
formal control can be enacted to lead to controlee selfcontrol, we needed to examine a project where the
MRR was poorly enacted, in accordance with the
principles of theoretical sampling in which contrasting
results occurred (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lee, 1989; Yin,
2003). The senior technical manager provided a list of
recent projects (both finished and ongoing ones). The
first author screened these projects looking for
incomplete MRR checklists. An incomplete MRR
checklist signaled the MRR was not enacted in line
with controller goals. It was thus a proxy for outcomes
unintended by the controller. Initially, the researcher
flagged two ongoing projects as potential contrasting
cases. After the projects finished, the researcher
solicited the MRR checklist of these projects through
the assistance of the senior technical manager. Project
Beta featured the most improperly filled checklists
(demonstrating unsatisfactory MRR enactment).
Therefore, it was chosen for comparison with Project
Alpha (Yin, 2003). In terms of similarities, both
projects employed the MRR to control production and
both had similar numbers of engineers and two
designers: Project Alpha involved seven engineers,
while Project Beta had nine. Both projects had
engineers with similar types of work experience (see
the information for industry and company tenure in
Table 2). Both the senior technical manager in Project
Alpha and the product engineer in Project Beta had
formal authority to implement the MRR as a controller.
The similarities between the projects allowed for the
replication/extension of emergent theory (Eisenhardt,
1989).
For each project, data were collected through
interviews, internal control documents, and site visits.
The predominant method of data collection was in-

depth interviews at the site over a period of seven
months. The first author conducted semistructured
interviews with interviewees from different
organizational
levels
(management
and
nonmanagement) and engineering sections. Questions
were asked about interviewees’ positions and roles
within the organization. Then, questions were asked
about the processes of the new product project from a
project management perspective. Such questions
focused on general control and coordination problems
in new product projects. Finally, specific questions
about the MRR enacted in the pilot production process
were asked. Such questions included those on
facilitation, performance standards, monitoring,
reward/punishment, and consequences associated with
the MRR implementation. Overall, interviews lasted
between one and two hours and were recorded and
transcribed verbatim. A total of 17 interviews with 13
interviewees were conducted in MassCo’s Taiwan
premises. Table 2 summarizes the interviewees’
background information for both projects.
The collected control documents contained 569 pages
of data and included MRR checklists for each project,
including meeting minutes, orientation and training
materials, engineering change requests, and email
communication. We also reviewed engineering design
drawings, meeting presentation slides and other project
documents. In many cases, the documents helped
illuminate and clarify earlier insights drawn from
interviews. They alerted the first author to important
leads to pursue or contradictions to understand and
allowed inferences to be made about the agendas and
interests of the various actors. For example, in an email
thread on a minor production issue, a product engineer
carbon copied the email to an SMT (surface mount
technology) engineer’s direct supervisor to ensure his
compliance. The behavior pattern we observed in the
email exchange corresponded with our interview data.
Documents also helped ameliorate the retrospective
nature of the interviews. We could cross-index
statements made by the interviewees, making it easier
to establish when events actually occurred, because of
the date/time stamps on the documents.
During site visits, the first author observed the site
layout, and the interaction between participants. Site
visits were arranged before interviews started so that
the first author could gain a preliminary understanding
of the site. For example, the first author, wearing a
cleanroom suit, was accompanied by the Center
director on visits to assembly lines and cells in
MassCo’s Taiwan facilities. After data collection
started, the first author sometimes went into town with
interviewees for meals. Field notes were taken on the
day of the visit. They included notes on informal
conversations, drawings of the site, the researcher’s
reflections and further questions to be pursued.

319

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

Table 2. Background Information of Interviewees
Industry tenure
(in years)

Company tenure
(in years)

# interviews

Center director

23

13

2

Senior technical manager

12

4

3

Sectional head of
mechanical engineering

7

7

1

Project manager

11

10

1

SMT engineer

12

3

1

Mechanical engineer

7

6

1

Product engineer

11

4.5

1

Designer

3

2

1

Project manager

11

10

1

SMT engineer

11

5

1

Mechanical engineer

4

4

2

Product engineer

11

2

1

Industrial engineer

12

4

1

Title
Management

Case Alpha

Case Beta

Total

3.3 Data Analysis
Informed by our preliminary analytical model, each
case was split into episodes of interaction that were
triggered by a major project event (e.g., release of a
prototype) and ended with changes in the control
context (e.g., MRR as a reference point for two-way
communication). Each episode had a certain continuity
in the activities, separated by discontinuities in the
behavioral patterns associated with the dissemination
and adoption of the MRR in the project (Langley,
1999). For example, in one episode, the controller
lifted communication barriers and crafted channels for
communication (e.g., meetings) to improve project
transparency; controlees then could use the MRR to
collect information for product analysis. This
facilitated the construction of controlees’ capacity for
self-monitoring and became the point of departure for
another episode. By examining successive episodes of
social interaction, we could understand how
(inter)action in one episode led to changes in the
context that affected action in subsequent episodes.
Three episodes of social interaction surrounding the
focal control (i.e., the MRR) were compared across the
two cases.
The analysis proceeded in three stages, following the
logic of constant comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Huberman & Miles, 1998; Yin, 2003). In the first stage,
we analyzed documents and interviews to uncover the
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MRR’s main technical areas and the sequences for the
enactment of those areas in each case. By the end of
the first stage, we had an understanding of the
chronological flow of events and could identify three
key episodes for each case. In the second stage, we
coded and mapped pieces of evidence to elements of
our preliminary model to draw a rich picture of social
interaction within each case. A draft codebook was
created after the two authors read and discussed
separate case profiles and mapped a set of quotes to
concepts in our preliminary model (i.e., deductive
coding) (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The first author
coded the data, while the second author played devil’s
advocate. Discrepancies were discussed and the
codebook was modified to achieve agreement.
Episodes of social interaction were examined to
analyze how and why one episode led to another. New
concepts were allowed to emerge and were categorized
(i.e., inductive coding). These new codes captured the
patterns and reasons for controller/controlee
(inter)action, enactment outcomes of individual
episodes, and project outcomes. Together, the coding
uncovered (1) what the controller and controlee did in
association with the MRR; (2) why they behaved in a
particular way; and (3) what consequences the enacted
MRR had. Sample categories/concepts coded and
developed are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Representative Quotes Grouped According to Code Categories
Category

Concept

Definition

Quote

Context

Other controls
(formal)

A mechanism specifying desired
outcomes/behaviors as a policy or
rule for the engineers to engage in
with explicit contingent
rewards/punishments ensuing

… had to meet our departmental KPIs [key performance
indicators], like overall productivity, MOH
[manufacturing overheads] … (industrial engineer,
Project Beta)

Other controls
(clan)

A mechanism instituted by a group
of individuals and relying on
shared norms, values, or beliefs to
regulate behaviors

[Team members] could check each other’s schedule,
knowing who had been careless filling in the doc or who
had lagged behind … a source of pressure … forced them
to close issues … or the team would be in trouble (senior
technical manager, Project Alpha)

Noncontrol
factors

Contextual factors influencing the
controller’s or controlee’s choices
of action

… I felt like I had no power to make any decision.… The
R&D [designers] meddled in things. We only made
decisions on minor issues. For important issues they
would step in and make decisions for us (mechanical
engineer, Project Beta).

Enabling style

Controllers disseminate
information about the MRR and
control activities and allow
controlees to adapt the MRR

I was not more knowledgeable than the mechanical or
product engineers.… They told me what to add to the
checklist and then I did it accordingly … new version is
available [on a shared server] (senior technical manager,
Project Alpha)

Authoritative
style

Controllers hide information about
the MRR and control activities and
disallow controlees to deviate from
the MRR

I queried each engineer [about their progress] and
checked off items…. I didn’t send the doc to the engineers
… unless something serious happened. Then I would
highlight the MRR item and send [the checklist] to the
PIC [person in charge]…. I would send the doc to his
direct supervisor… (junior product engineer, Project
Beta)

External
control

Controlees receive goals/means/
rewards/punishments from others
and take no ownership

… We’re only there to support them [the project manager
and the designers]…. It’s the PM who had to face the
time-to-market pressure… (industrial engineer, Project
Beta)

Self-goals

Controlees have a high degree of
influence in determining goals for
themselves or set goals higher than
those set by others

[Finding design bugs] is an important part of our
work…. [One bug] persisted … we judged it to be a
design issue. They [designers] first were not persuaded
and argued that this couldn’t be the cause. We kept
testing it with many different methods. (product engineer,
Project Alpha)

Selfmonitoring

Controlees gather cues about their
behaviors/performance, track
deviations and strive to come up
with solutions

I suggested the addition of two or three items to the
[MRR] checklist [for the controller’s approval]. For the
past few months, I’d encountered several problems with
packaging and labeling, like the label stuck out from the
surface or did not stick ... they were minor issues, which
could easily escape our notice… (mechanical engineer,
Project Alpha)

Intrinsic
motivation

Controlees demonstrate a high
level of autonomy or identify
design auditing as congruent with
personal needs

We started the manufacturability checks at the lab pilot
run phase. If we could, we would have done it much
earlier… it’s exactly what we had to do. I don’t think it
increased our workload. (product engineer, Project
Alpha)

Control
enactment

Controlee
response
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Table 3. Representative Quotes Grouped According to Code Categories
Enactment
outcomes

Project
outcomes

Facilitation/
hindrance

Formal control enacted
… [With the MRR] now the project manager, layout
enhances/depletes controlees’
[engineers], R&D [designers] could simply use the
capacity/motivation for self-control checklists on their own. (SMT engineer, Project Alpha)

Compensation/
reinforcement

Weaknesses of formal control are
compensated for/reinforced

There’s no way I could get the checks properly done [due
to situational constraints]…. [The product engineer] kept
asking for the data to fill in the MRR. In the end, I made
a guess…. The guess could be very wrong. (industrial
engineer, Project Beta)

Project
deliverables

A combination of deadlines,
product functionality or service
quality in deliveries

… two weeks ahead of the scheduled delivery date …
impressed by our quick response and service quality …
[the client] was very happy about that. (project manager,
Project Alpha)

Socioemotional Nonfinancial aspects of projects
consequences
that (fail to) meet controlees’
psychological needs (e.g., the
ability to exercise influence,
recognition)

In the third stage, we moved from episode-level, to
case-level analysis and comparative case analysis. A
model was inductively constructed for each case,
explaining linkages between control enactment and
controlee response in the context of the three episodes.
These two models were then compared to allow us to
arrive at our final process model.

4

Findings

The MRR was implemented and available for use in
early January 2009. By the beginning of data collection,
engineers had already signed up for and attended one
of two MRR training sessions at the Center. During the
training, the engineers were introduced to the major
technical areas of the MRR. Members from both
projects thus heard about what the MRR was and the
information it contained. However, when and how to
apply the MRR along with other controls was the
purview of a senior technical manager in Project Alpha
and a product engineer in Project Beta.
An examination of the social interaction surrounding
the MRR for the two projects revealed the same three
episodes, coinciding with three product development
phases at MassCo. These were the: (1) lab pilot run, (2)
engineering pilot run, and (3) pilot production run.
During the lab pilot run (Episode 1), designers were
charged with producing prototypes, occasionally with
engineers’ input about product design. The lab pilot
run was critical for engineers to learn about the new
product and to identify design errors from the
production perspective. In relation to this episode, we
discuss how the controllers in the two projects
distributed distinct messages about and enacted the
MRR in ways that would develop (or not) engineers’
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We didn’t have the power to block the product … very
frustrated … whenever there’s a problem, the project
manager always got very nervous and questioned our
solution… (SMT engineer, Project Beta)

capacity to handle their new responsibilities (i.e.,
“constructing capacity” vs. “constructing constraints”).
During the engineering pilot run (Episode 2), engineers
produced a small number of products to ensure the new
design was producible within a particular
manufacturing environment. Production problems
were explicitly considered as part of product design.
The two groups applied the MRR differently to debug
the product and production process—engineers in
Project Alpha adapted the MRR to their tasks and
communicated
interactively
with
designers
(“negotiating discretion”), whereas in Project Beta, the
MRR was principally used to coerce engineers into
performing tasks they felt were not in their purview
(“negotiating dependence”).
During the pilot production run (Episode 3), a
relatively large number of products were produced
using the mass production process. This run was
designed to identify issues that would arise during
mass production. Deliverables to controllers became
more serious because any problem would increase
production costs, resulting in a poor project outcome.
In this episode, engineers used the MRR to resolve
pending problems and detail future solutions for
unresolved problems in Project Alpha (“toward
problem solving”). In Project Beta, the resolution of
many problems was delayed, and engineers used the
MRR to cover problems and avoid blame (“toward
self-protection”).
Overall, we noticed a decisive difference in the way the
MRR was used within the two projects right from the
beginning. Understandably, the final enactment
outcomes differed.
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Figure 3. How Formal Control was Enacted to Facilitate Self-Control in Project Alpha

4.1 Project Alpha
Project Alpha was commissioned by a Fortune 500
company. This was the first time MassCo became part
of this client’s supply chain. However, the project
schedule was extremely tight. The client’s
international purchase officer in Taiwan even
considered on-time completion to be “impossible.”
When the project started, a senior technical manager
from the Center, Clark (the controller), solicited
project information from the project manager. He
realized engineers had been given about four weeks to
complete pilot production and volunteered to help
implement the MRR in Project Alpha. Clark was
originally trained as an SMT engineer, was known for
his emphasis on punctuality, and was nicknamed
“Clock.” He was an architect of the MRR, and “[had]
good knowledge of its spirit” (Center director) and the
authority to settle disputes over the MRR. Figure 3
provides an overview of how self-control was enabled
in Project Alpha over the three episodes. The figure
will be elaborated on in the following results
description, with italicized headers of individual
paragraphs corresponding to enactment outcomes in
each episode (i.e., yellow arrows in Figure 3).

Episode 1: Constructing Capacity. Early in the lab
pilot run phase, Clark wanted to provide Project Alpha
with a high degree of formalization. He felt the MRR
implementation would facilitate the swift delivery of
the overall pilot production outcome. However, there
were situational contingency-formal control gaps
between the formal control (i.e., the MRR) and the
project situation, including engineers’ confusion about
the MRR and contextual constraints that made it
difficult for engineers to follow the MRR. He thus
made clear his expectations of the MRR to the
engineers. Clark also coordinated with the project
manager and Center director to remove obstacles to the
MRR’s implementation.
MRR as a reference point for two-way
communication in the team. Clark held a briefing to
explain the MRR context and emphasized how its
implementation would help identify and solve
problems, especially those concerning product design.
He also placed the MRR checklist on a shared server
accessible to the engineers, the project manager, and
the designers.
Engineers thus understood they had the additional role
of a product design auditor and “the MRR was
originally designed for [another product line with
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problematic yield rates]” (SMT engineer, Project
Alpha). Engineers were encouraged to get involved in
product analysis activities as early as they could and to
raise issues with the MRR.

problems with the MRR arose (e.g., relevancy or
ownership of MRR checklist items), they were fully
discussed to further clarify controller goals (i.e.,
product auditing).

The engineers discussed with Clark obstacles that
could impede the MRR implementation. Two major
obstacles at that time were (1) designers’ domination
over engineers, and (2) other projects that competed
for resources available to engineers (e.g., limited
factory facilities or having to pay attention to multiple
ongoing projects). At MassCo, designers rarely sought
engineers’ opinions, and tended not to share project
information without being asked. Clark thus solicited
support from the project manager for the MRR
implementation. He invited the project manager to the
first meeting with engineers. As a result, the project
manager understood that the MRR could “provide a
platform for discussion” between engineers and
designers. After the meeting, the project manager
explained the MRR to designers and demanded they
respond to issues raised by engineers. Two-way
communication between engineers and designers was
thus established, thereby enhancing transparency to
help engineers clarify controller goals and their new
role (Figure 3, Arrow ①).

MRR adapted and aligned with situations. Clark
allowed engineers to individually reinterpret and adapt
MRR items to the situation (e.g., reassigned
ownership). For example, engineers could classify
some items as “must-do” or “recommend-to-do” (SMT
engineer) and were able to perform checks as they
considered appropriate. Furthermore, engineers were
able to suggest additional items or critical elements
that had not been considered in the MRR based on their
prior experience. Clark used those suggestions to
improve the MRR.

MRR became a tool for early design auditing. With
the consent of the Center director, Clark also helped
negate noncontrol factors that could constrain
engineers’
performance
of
their
new
roles/responsibilities. For example, he set aside other
big projects for them and rescheduled several smaller
ones to ensure that the facilities they required were
made available.

Engineers successfully “revealed many design
problems” (senior technical manager, Project Alpha)
and recorded them in the MRR for further designer
audits. For example, the MRR encouraged engineers to
examine the alignment of holes in the mechanical
assembly from different perspectives, including
manufacturing efficiency, ease of maintenance, and
client use. Three major potential defects were
discovered. Engineers informed designers about these
defects and inquired about design changes. Designers
explained that one of them was unchangeable due to
the client’s insistence on this design feature and
demanded more evidence of the other two defects.
Engineers kept monitoring the defects, finding
approximately 40 production problems but resolving
many of them.

Engineers felt that they were well supported and could
use the MRR to access product information for design
auditing. For example, engineers could use the MRR
to demand the early release of information from
designers to discover design flaws soon after
introduction. The information included engineering
drawings, designers’ design bug reviews, and
functionality test plans (e.g., versions of software and
parameter configurations). They were sometimes
hyperlinked to MRR items to support engineers’
judgment about the design. Engineers could also
provide results of their analyses to designers as early
as “the lab pilot run phase” (product engineer). Once
engineers and designers agreed on the design,
engineers could commit themselves to improving
production (Figure 3, Arrow ②). That is, impediment
removal further enhanced transparency to allow
engineers’ self-monitoring.
Episode 2: Negotiating Discretion. When the
engineering pilot run started, engineers already
understood the MRR’s history and rationale (and its
embedded goals). They executed the MRR and
checked off items accordingly. When disputes and
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I suggested the addition of two or three
items to the [MRR] checklist [for the
controller’s approval]. Over the past few
months, I’d encountered several problems
with packaging and labeling, like labels
that stuck out from the surface or did not
stick ... they were minor issues, which could
easily escape our notice. With them being
included, we could prevent them
(mechanical engineer, Project Alpha).

Because of engineers’ individual interpretation of the
MRR and its ensuing modification (i.e., repair enacted),
they accepted product auditing as their responsibility
and readily embraced the adapted MRR to master their
tasks (i.e., self-goals setting) (Figure 3, Arrow ②). Their
acceptance of this additional responsibility was due to
the utility of the MRR in helping them perform their
tasks (i.e., review and monitor design defects), rather
than their intrinsic desire to do so.
Episode 3: Toward Problem Solving. Subsequently,
the focus moved to addressing the problems identified
to meet relevant control requirements. Over the years,
the engineers at Project Alpha developed a routine to
deal with and report engineering problems within one
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week. Publicity associated with the checklist put
engineers under each other’s scrutiny and made them
aware that lateness could have a snowball effect
impacting the overall project. The senior technical
manager also emphasized punctuality. As a result,
punctuality became a buzzword to allow the project
team to “have enough time to evaluate the
manufacturability of product design, prepare
components, and take action” (SMT engineer, Project
Alpha).
A safe space for new behaviors. Clark left the
engineers to perform their tasks. While the project was
under a tight schedule, because the MRR was new,
Clark relaxed many formal controls (i.e., tolerance for
interim deviations, loose relationships between
rewards/punishments,
and
performance)
to
accommodate necessary changes to current behavioral
patterns. Engineers selectively responded to controls
and adapted behaviors appropriate to emergent
situations. The only time Clark intervened was when
they lagged behind the agreed schedule or did not fill in
the MRR properly. Even when Clark intervened, he did
so through friendly emails or corridor talks rather than
through formal disciplinary processes. Because some
controls were relaxed (i.e., repair), a space emerged for
engineers to adapt behaviors appropriate for emergent
situations without fear of being punished (Figure 3,
Arrow ④). “We did what we needed to do … Clark only
occasionally intervened. Like when I missed some
details or forgot to check off some items, Clark would
send a reminder or chatted with me about it (product
engineer, Project Alpha).
A collaborative culture to buttress the pursuit of selfgoals. Norms and routines conducive to collaboration
started to emerge (e.g., punctuality, respect for
professional expertise). Due to the repeated enactment
of transparency and repair, individual engineers
understood that being late would create a snowball
effect that would impact the project’s schedule and the
relationship between their tasks and others’ tasks.
Consequently, they contributed their expertise in a
cooperative way. Collaboration buttressed the
individual’s setting and the pursuit of challenging selfgoals. Since information was available and potential
threats (e.g., schedule delay) could be spotted early,
engineers were better able to plan actions: “…like the
mechanical engineer needed extra time for getting a
fixture. I had to get [a tool] and I estimated that it would
take us a month to get it … issues were flagged in
advance. If there’s any difficulty, we negotiated.
(product engineer, Project Alpha)
Also, the checklist, compiled from the Center’s best
practices, was applied as an overarching control to
reduce control conflicts. The checklist reduced mistakes
and reworking, saving engineers’ energy and mental
capacity.

Although most tasks were allocated a week for
completion, engineers were intrinsically motivated to
use their excess capacity to impose a more challenging
time limit of “3 days” for addressing minor engineering
problems (SMT engineer). This gave them more time
and energy to “focus on addressing [real] problems”
(product engineer, Project Alpha).
To request a change in the design, engineers first had to
prove there was a design defect (faulty software or/and
hardware design), which caused a product malfunction
or manufacturing inefficiencies. To find one defect
related to errors in the region code, engineers repeatedly
tested the product in different ways. As a result of the
repeated testing, designers acknowledged that this was a
design defect (and not a defect of the testing process).
Although designers failed to come up with a solution,
both designers and engineers agreed that it was an “open
issue, to-be-solved in the next [product] version”
(product engineer).
Another defect was related to the design of a shielding
cover. Engineers indicated that the one-piece design
increased the risk to components when they had to
remove the cover for inspection or maintenance
purposes. Engineers provided evidence, showing that
“one piece [out of five] was damaged during pilot
production” (SMT engineer, Project Alpha). Engineers
voluntarily came up with a two-piece design with a
removable cover and helped source suppliers for the
new component. Designers thus had a healthy respect
for engineers and considered them “real experts” with
whom the designers would willingly work (designer,
Project Alpha). Overall, because collaboration was
continually facilitated, a collaborative culture emerged,
with engineers across the team being able to set
challenging self-goals and competently pursue these
goals (Figure 3, Arrow ⑤).
Project outcome. The outcome of Project Alpha was
positive. First, the project was completed two weeks
earlier than planned. The client was impressed by the
team’s detailed interim reports and product quality.
Second, engineers felt empowered to identify and
resolve problems. They voluntarily uncovered and
identified the causes of some problems early and helped
to solve these problems with designers. The project
manager and designers thus attributed project success
partially to engineers’ “timely identification of design
defects” (project manager, Project Alpha).

4.2 Project Beta
Project Beta was commissioned by a Fortune 500
company that was a repeat customer. The project
involved the design and manufacture of a mature
product that used an old technology. A junior product
engineer was charged with overseeing its pilot
production and was informed that they had seven weeks
to complete the task.
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Figure 4. How Formal Control was Enacted to Impede Self-Control in Project Beta
Episode 1: Constructing Constraints. Like Project
Alpha, there was a gap between what the MRR
mandated and the actual work required on the project.
However, during the lab pilot run, the junior product
engineer took no action to clarify or circulate
information about the MRR for engineers and other
project members.
MRR reinforced control/constraints on controlees.
The junior product engineer considered the MRR as
another administrative hassle engineers had to face. He
thus enacted the MRR as just one of many controls to
regulate engineers, which allowed him to “[keep] an
eye” on individual engineers and to record their
progress. Designer domination was also obvious in
Project Beta, with designers hoarding project
information and engineers acting as passive
information receivers.
The junior product engineer was informed about the
project before engineers. Designers invited him to see
a prototype. However, the junior product engineer did
not update other engineers on the project status, nor did
he make clear when and how the MRR would be
applied. He kept the MRR to himself and assumed
most associated administrative functions, including
checking off items on engineers’ behalf. Engineers
became quite confused about “where the MRR stood”
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and “how it should be implemented” (mechanical
engineer, Project Beta). They waited for instructions
about the MRR implementation.
The project manager was also kept in the dark about
the MRR and did not see the MRR as a project
management tool. Instead, she viewed the MRR as a
way for the Center to exert control on engineers. She
used a separate checklist to assess product design. In
Project Beta, designers were their own auditors, and
engineers were not allowed to give input. Designers
did not even hear about the MRR. This cut the
engineers off from product analysis activities (Figure
4, Arrow ① ). Overall, because the junior product
engineer did not remove impediments (i.e., confusion,
designer domination), transparency was inhibited,
leading to engineers’ misunderstanding of controller
goals and the MRR.
Episode 2: Negotiating Dependence. When the
engineering pilot run started, engineers only received
project information from designers about routine
production checks.
MRR did not create behavioral change. The junior
product engineer queried engineers about their
progress and checked off items in private, without
sending them the checklist. However, without more

The Reinforcing Effects of Formal Control Enactment

knowledge about the MRR, engineers could not use the
MRR to give timely input about the product. They fell
back on their usual routine checks and took no
responsibilities for product auditing. Many items in the
MRR were left with remarks, such as “under review”
or “to be done by [a date]” (product engineer).
The junior product engineer segregated the MRR
according to different functions and informed
engineers of isolated tasks they were responsible for.
Engineers had few opportunities to physically access
the MRR. Engineers did not know how their behaviors
impacted others or the overall project. Due to a lack of
transparency, they performed the same behaviors on
this project that they normally performed on other
similar projects. Thus, at this stage, the MRR did not
result in a change in engineer behavior (Figure 4,
Arrow ②).
MRR remained misaligned with situations. The
only time an engineer saw the checklist was when the
junior product engineer noticed that “something
serious happened” (junior product engineer, Project
Beta) and felt the engineer in question was responsible
for the problematic item. At that point, the engineer
received a copy of a part of the checklist with
problematic items highlighted. The junior product
engineer would also carbon copy the engineer’s direct
supervisor to ensure compliance.
When conflicts over responsibilities for MRR items
occurred or the relevance of MRR items to the product
was raised, the junior product engineer was the one
who determined who was responsible for the
problematic item or whether an item was relevant.

engineer to reschedule solutions for several production
issues. They all agreed to ensure that issues were
resolved by the last week of pilot production. To
ensure compliance, the junior product engineer
strengthened his control through frequent reviews of
engineers. In the last week of pilot production, he
queried engineers about their progress every day. As
controls and constraints increased, engineers began to
feel overstretched.
I had many on-going projects and each of
them also had to meet our departmental
KPIs [key performance indicators], like
overall productivity, MOH [manufacturing
overheads] … we’re asked to help each
other out, but really had no energy left.
We’re totally overstretched. (industrial
engineer, Project Beta)
The junior product engineer required that many checks
in the MRR be performed exactly as specified,
regardless of the on-the-ground relationship between
those tasks and project achievement. For example, the
MRR mandated engineers to perform two checks: one
a week before, and the other a day before each pilot
production run. The junior product engineer would
then check on the exact time the task was performed
and the process taken. These checks required that
resources that were not forthcoming be made available
to engineers. For example, the assembly lines the
engineers were supposed to use were often booked by
others.

This led to disagreements and perfunctory
performance for some items. Engineers would perform
checks to uncover problems and come up with
temporary solutions. Due to a lack of repair, there
remained a gap between the MRR and the situations
engineers faced (Figure 4, Arrow ③).

To overcome these constraints and to satisfy the
immediate demands made by the junior product
engineer, engineers would perform perfunctory checks
or even “make a guess” (industrial engineer, Project
Beta). Engineers devoted energy to address issues in
the MRR instead of addressing concerns in production
itself (Figure 4, Arrow ④). The mechanical application
of the MRR (no repair) led to controlees’ depletion of
capacity.

I didn’t think [one task] was my
responsibility. It should have been under
the purview of the product engineer… we
should have discussed about this, but we
didn’t. Up to today, I still disagree that it
should be my responsibility (SMT engineer).

A self-protective culture emerged. Second, designers
rejected engineers’ requests for design changes
without any explanation. This showed designers’ lack
of respect toward the engineers. Because of designers’
mistrust of engineers, they discounted engineers’
opinions, even responding to engineers with sarcasm.

Episode 3: Toward Self-Protection. At the onset of
the pilot production run, five potential design errors
and a dozen production issues were identified, based
on limited information from designers. In this episode,
a decisive change in engineers’ behavior occurred.
Instead of applying the MRR to root out issues, the
engineers applied it to absolve themselves of
responsibility for problems.

[In a meeting] our people told [a designer]
that the 0.5mm distance between two pads
was far too small. It would be better if it were
over 0.8. The designer then replied derisively,
saying that it’s the global trend to produce
smaller and more sophisticated gadgets
(mechanical engineer, Project Beta).

MRR depleted controlees’ resources. First,
engineers sought the permission of the junior product

Engineers “could only suggest changes to the designer”
(mechanical engineer, Project Beta), but received a
disproportionate amount of blame when things went
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wrong. Therefore, engineers used the MRR as a
document to avoid blame and disclaim responsibility
during an audit (i.e., unintended by the controller). For
example, after his request for a design change was
refused, an engineer asked the junior product engineer
to put a remark reading “design couldn’t be changed”
and “[designer’s name] as the PIC [person in charge]”
(SMT engineer, Project Beta) in the checklist. Overall,
disproportionate punishment led to controlees’
enacting self-protective behaviors (Figure 4, Arrow ⑤).
Project outcome. The outcome of Project Beta was
not so positive. First, Project Beta was completed with
a pilot production yield rate of 88.54% and several
design errors were unaddressed. Although the rate
surpassed the requested threshold (85%), engineers
were not satisfied because this was a mature product.
Second, mechanical execution of the MRR reinforced
engineers’ sense of subjugation. They were closely
monitored by the product engineer, given “no power to
block the [problematic] product” (SMT engineer,
Project Beta), and blamed for problems about which
they “could do nothing” (mechanical engineer, Project
Beta). Engineers felt unfairly exploited. The Appendix
summarizes
the
temporal
sequence
of
controller/controlee (inter)action in each project.

5

Discussion and Implications

This study aims to advance our understanding of
control enactment in the complex IT project context.
To achieve this, we studied the emerging process
surrounding an enacted formal control and,
specifically, how the enactment process could lead to
controlee self-control. Our findings suggest the
importance of the enactment of both transparency and
repair for controlees’ understanding of controller goals
and the building of a trusting/collaborative culture (i.e.,
clan control). In Episode 1 of Project Alpha, because
of the repeated enactment of transparency (e.g., twoway communication), engineers understood controller
goals and means to deliver results (i.e., via early
involvement in product analysis). However,
expectations were formally conveyed or relayed (e.g.,
to designers) in formal meetings or in the name of the
controller and/or project manager. The engineers thus
had no personal attachment to assigned tasks. In
Episode 2, because the controller repeatedly allowed
for repair (e.g., controller’s relaxing of other controls),
engineers could derive personal goals and meaning
from their tasks. Further, given the complexity of some
issues (e.g., complex design errors), they could not
perform effectively without others contributing their
energy, ideas or time toward reaching or exceeding
controller goals. Therefore, it was not until Episode 3
when both transparency and repair became rooted in
the control context and collaborative norms were
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reinforced (e.g., information sharing) that engineers
felt genuinely confident about directing their own
activities (e.g., expediting routine checks) to work
toward their self-goals and controller goals. In contrast,
transparency and repair were inhibited from the outset
of Project Beta. Repeated misunderstanding and
mistrust led engineers to engage in self-protective
behaviors.

5.1 The Role of Transparency and Repair
in Reinforcing Cycles
Figure 5 integrates theory and our empirical results to
demonstrate how controllers can enact the same formal
control, but because they employ distinct control styles,
they create divergent controlee responses and
reinforcing cycles. In a complex project situation, it is
impossible for the controller to anticipate all possible
circumstances and design formal controls accordingly.
New controls introduced to change controlees’
behaviors thus must be amended as situations emerge
(“situational contingency-formal control gap”). Within
a project, there are some tasks where controlees know
the appropriate behaviors for completing their tasks,
exact outcomes to be achieved, or exact means-ends
connections (clear tasks), and some tasks where
controlees do not know the appropriate behaviors,
outcomes to be achieved, or means-ends connections
(uncertain tasks) (March & Simon, 1958). Clear tasks
provide opportunities for controlees to perform
appropriate behaviors for that specific project situation
and to infer and validate their understanding of
controller goals.
The combination of clear tasks, empowerment, and the
controller providing feedback on task performance
allowed controlees to correctly interpret project
situations and understand controller goals. For
example, in Project Alpha, engineers were told to use
the MRR to audit product design and knew that
effective auditing required early participation in
product analysis. Because they could adapt the MRR
according to controller feedback to complete their
tasks, they were able to understand and confirm these
goals. In contrast, when tasks are unclear, and the
controller hoards information and does not provide
feedback, controlees become confused and avoid
responsibility (to avoid punishment). Distinct styles of
control enactment by the controller thus trigger
separate reinforcing cycles.
In our theorization, we identified two principal
elements in formal control enactment, namely
transparency and repair. It is the repeated enactment of
the two elements by the controller that enables the
development of controlees’ capacity and motivation to
exercise self-control in response to emerging situations.
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Figure 5. Reinforcing Cycles of Formal Control Enactment in Complex IT Projects
Creating transparency involves the controller’s crafting
of two-way communication channels (and lifting
constraints on those channels) to clarify
goals/requirements and to solicit continuous feedback.
Thus, controllers who are open with controlees can send
clear signals about their motives and create an implicit
promise that controlees’ feedback and opinions will be
appreciated. Because controlees repeatedly witness the
communication and action based on such implicit
promises (e.g., controllers ask for and follow up on

controlees’ feedback), they can make correct inferences
about the controller’s expectations and feel they can
come forward with any issue (Vogelgesang, Leroy, &
Avolio, 2013). For example, in Episode 1 of Project
Alpha, Clark spent time explaining to engineers the
objective of the MRR and discussed the means to deliver
those objectives (e.g., early involvement in product
analysis). He explicitly told them he wanted feedback
about improving the manufacturing process. This gave
engineers the opportunity to involve themselves in
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design decisions. Clark thus understood the constraints
faced by engineers and helped alleviate them. Because
of the communication, the engineers could determine
which behaviors would help achieve controller goals
and then chose to perform them, monitoring their own
progress. In contrast, inhibiting transparency involves
the controller hoarding information from controlees.
The controlees thus cannot make correct inferences
about controller goals and may thus distrust the
controller.
In some cases, formal controls can malfunction, causing
inappropriate behavior to arise, especially if a changing
situation requires changed behavior. If controlees
perceive they are likely to be punished for emergent,
innovative behaviors appropriate to changing
circumstances, it is unlikely they will perform such
behaviors. Thus, controllers must create a safe space for
controlees to try new behaviors. Allowing for repair
involves relaxing formal control to allow controlees to
take the initiative to try behaviors they otherwise would
not. In contrast, inhibiting repair involves the use of
punishment to strengthen control on controlees. Repair
allows for two kinds of controlee behaviors. First, it
allows for behaviors that formal control might
unintentionally suppress. For example, one initial
formal control exerted was assigning certain tasks to
individual controlees. However, complex problems
could have multiple causes (e.g., hardware
incompatibility, software bugs) and the individual
formally assigned to a role may not be appropriate for it.
Hence, the more appropriate behavior is for controlees
to take collective ownership. In Project Alpha, one
MRR item was assigned to an engineer to check a design
feature. The engineer explained to the controller that this
would actually impede dynamic problem diagnosis.
Several engineers thus jointly examined the design
feature from their respective perspectives.
Second, repair allows emergent behaviors to develop to
address
unanticipated
issues.
Research
has
demonstrated that professionals often genuinely want
things to work and to make a difference (Alvesson &
Kärreman, 2007). If given the space, they will enact
behaviors concordant with a desire to be responsible. In
Episode 3 of Project Alpha, for example, because of the
way control was enacted in prior episodes, engineers
understood their new responsibility (i.e., product
auditing) in relation to others and the overall project.
They thus began to take on a broader range of activities
beyond those initially prescribed by the MRR (i.e.,
testing product design, reporting design issues). These
included challenging the existing design, proposing
joint solutions of design issues, and monitoring project
progress, something they had never done previously.
We next detail separate reinforcing cycles triggered by
distinct control styles and controlee responses as
illustrated in Figure 5.
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In Episode 1 of Project Alpha, because of transparency,
controlees began to use the MRR to acquire product
information from designers and to seek designer
feedback; and in Episode 2, because of repair and the
continuous creation of transparency, the controlees
could suggest informed changes to the MRR, and
selectively test the relevant design features specified in
the MRR without the fear of being punished. As a result,
controlees come to know controller goals and the
means-ends relationships, constructing their capacity to
handle their responsibilities. They also know they can
adapt control, i.e., to negotiate discretion to complete
their tasks.
As controlees witness greater transparency and then
repair, they internalize controller goals (i.e., transform
controller goals into their own), experience decreased
vulnerability, and become confident in their own
judgments. A positive reinforcing cycle is created. In
Episode 3 of Project Alpha, the controller further
relaxed controls to accommodate new behaviors for
uncertain tasks. This leads to the creation of a safe
space for controlees to judiciously apply their personal
resources to improvise or experiment with new
behaviors that are potentially beneficial to the project
(e.g., collaborating behaviors). Furthermore, the
coordination of collective efforts is required because of
the inherent uncertainty of complex projects. In
Episode 3 of Project Alpha, the controller facilitated
collaboration by emphasizing information sharing and
respect for expertise. A collaborative culture (i.e., clan
control) emerged to support controlees to contribute
their expertise in a cooperative manner. The engineers
thus could improvise for joint problem solving and the
pursuit of challenging goals beyond the MRR
requirements (i.e., self-goal setting). In sum,
transparency and repair together foster controlees’
creative behaviors toward problem solving to benefit
both the controller and controlee (i.e., self-controlling).
For example, in addition to reporting design errors,
engineers also proposed a new design and helped
source new components to lower production risks. This
improved not only product design but also production
performance, leading to high performance.
Negative reinforcing cycles. Project Beta illustrates
what happens when formal control is enacted without
transparency and repair. Without transparency,
controlees are unsure of controller goals and what
appropriate behaviors would be. The most likely
response in this situation (as observed in Project Beta)
is for controlees to perform behaviors in alignment
with the status quo (i.e., lacking behavioral change),
with formal control becoming constraints on
controlees. Thus, engineers in Episode 1 of Project
Beta remained passive and allowed designers to run the
project. Of course, this need not be the only possible
controlee response. However, in complex IT projects,
the likelihood of a controlee who does not understand
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controller goals responding in a way consistent with
controller goals is low.
When new controls are introduced, there is a general
expectation that controlees’ behaviors will change.
When controlees are not performing new behaviors
anticipated by an authoritative-style controller, the
controller enacts punishment (i.e., inhibiting repair).
In Episode 2 of Project Beta, the controller demanded
engineers execute pre-specified checks under all
circumstances and threatened to punish them for
deviance. Without repair, controlees are unwilling to
risk adaptive behaviors and are not able to learn which
behaviors are effective for delivering desired results.
Because controlees do not understand controller goals
and distrust the controller, they feel that they are forced
to comply with formal control. They develop
dependence on the controller and perform tasks as they
are told to. Because those tasks are expectable,
controlees are still able to attain acceptable
performance.
However, the consistent lack of transparency and
repair creates a negative reinforcing cycle, with a sense
of a lack of safety and incompetence emerging. This
exacerbates misunderstanding and distrust among the
project team. When situations emerge, controlees
would like to perform appropriate behaviors (at least to
avoid punishment). However, because they do not
know what these behaviors are (only knowing existing
behaviors which are ineffective for delivering the
outcome), this drains their personal resources and
induces dysfunctional behaviors. The controller’s
overemphasis on punishment could further induce a
self-protective culture where controlees focus on
minimizing loss to themselves rather than try to ensure
the project proceeds successfully (i.e., failed clan
control). In Episode 3 of Project Beta, an engineer
identified some design errors and reported them to the
designer. Because the designer refused to change the
design, to protect himself, the engineer asked the
controller to record the designer as responsible for
associated production risks. The engineer then left the
issue unresolved. Indeed, authoritative enactment can
exacerbate conflicts in goals, and induce controlees’
creative behaviors for achieving outcomes not harmful
to themselves (i.e., external controlling), eventually
resulting in low performance.

5.2 Relationship between Formal Control
and Self-control
Our study explains why enacting control in an enabling
style facilitates self-control to close the situational
contingency-formal control gap for the controller’s and
controlee’s benefit, while an authoritative enactment
prompts controlees to exploit the gap for selfprotection. Recall that self-control requires three
elements, self-goals, self-monitoring, and intrinsic
motivation.

Self-goals. Our results show that an enabling
enactment helps controlees align their self-goals with
controller goals for two reasons. First, transparency
allows controlees to understand controller goals.
Enabling-style controllers apply controls to explain to
controlees why controller goals are in place, and why
these controls are enacted (i.e., transparency). In
Episode 1 of Project Alpha, the enabling-style
controller explicitly highlighted the MRR’s
development intention (i.e., to identify design issues)
and made it accessible to controlees. He used it to
demonstrate how individual tasks were a part of
controller goals (e.g., via the temporal arrangement of
worksheets). Second, repair allows controlees to
derive personal meaning and purpose from tasks. The
enabling-style controller highlights to controlees when
controls should be ignored or adapted for individual
tasks. Controlees thus adapt controls and/or their
behaviors and see how they contribute to controller
goals. In Episode 2 of Project Alpha, the controller
allowed controlees to adapt the prescribed working
pace (i.e., one week for completing tasks). Controlees
differentiated between routine and nonroutine
components of their tasks and quickly completed the
routine component to expedite the overall process.
However, in Project Beta, the authoritative-style
controller disallowed adaptation of controlees’ work
arrangement and instead used the MRR as a stick to
beat nonperforming controlees. Controlees thus
performed tasks perfunctorily and used the MRR to
absolve them from their responsibilities.
Self-monitoring. Our results show that an enabling
enactment facilitates self-monitoring for two reasons.
First, transparency exposes controlees to projectrelevant information and performance feedback. This
helps controlees to improve both their individual and
collective performance. In Episode 1 of Project Alpha,
the controller enacted the MRR to help controlees
easily access (via a shared server) and navigate through
diverse information (by emphasizing the temporal
connection of tasks). Controlees thus knew they
needed to get involved early for effective product
auditing. Given the opportunity, controlees then chose
to demand designers’ release of product information
and provide their analysis to designers as early as
possible. Second, repair allows controlees to try new
behaviors to monitor and improve performance. In
Project Alpha, the controller enacted the MRR to
facilitate controlees’ independent judgments with
input/feedback from others. Controlees could thus
adapt or synthesize means to monitor and conduct their
tasks (e.g., examining product features from multiple
perspectives). In contrast, in Project Beta, because the
controller punished new behaviors, controlees chose
not to adapt their behaviors, but relied on the
controller’s guidance and evaluation.
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Intrinsic motivation. Although professionals are
initially self-motivated, they can only express this if
they feel safe (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). Our
results show that an enabling enactment improves
controlees’ motivation to succeed for two reasons.
First, transparency fosters trusting relationships and
increases controlees’ perceived odds of success.
Enabling-style controllers are open with their intent
and make relevant information available for
everyone’s consideration. Information thus reduces
dependence and allows controlees to cope effectively
with less optimal situations. In Project Alpha, the
enabling-style controller openly shared information
(Episode 1) and fostered norms for open
communication and collaboration (Episode 3).
Controlees thus felt confident in pursuing higher goals
and
making
independent
judgments
while
collaborating with others. Second, repair relaxes
controls, which in turn acts to conserve controlees’
personal resources (e.g., cognitive/emotional resources)
for coping with emerging problems. Personal
resources are essential for supporting controlees’
feelings of competence and autonomy (i.e., intrinsic
motivation) (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). In Episode 3 of
Project Alpha, the controller reduced redundant
controls and tolerated temporary deviations from the
MRR. Controlees thus experienced limited fear of
failure and could adapt the MRR as they considered
appropriate (e.g., for expediting routine checks). In
contrast, in Project Beta, the authoritative-style
controller applied the MRR to punish deviance under
all circumstances. This drained the controlees’
resources and motivation because they had to spread
out their efforts to manage all controls and were held
accountable for failures over which they had little
influence.
Together,
transparency
and
repair
foster
trusting/collaborative relationships, and controlees’
understanding of (1) the connection between controller
goals and their self-goals, and (2) means for achieving
both goals, leading to controlees’ increased motivation
and capacity to succeed. In contrast, the lack of
transparency and repair introduces misunderstanding
and mistrust, prompting controlees to embrace selfprotective behaviors.

5.3 Contributions to Behavioral Control
Theory
Our research contributes to behavioral control theory
in several important ways. First, this study explains the
role of control enactment in facilitating self-control.
Chua et al. (2012) argued that clan control is fostered
in projects through the use of formal control. We
extend that thinking by arguing that controllers can
facilitate controlee self-control, specifically by an
enabling enactment of formal control to promote a safe
space for personally risky behaviors (Park, Im, & Keil,
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2008) and a collaborative culture (i.e., clan control).
This suggests that researchers should examine control
enactments in various styles, with the control style
having a strong interactive effect (Keil et al., 2014;
Wiener et al., 2016). While our study supports the
effects of control enactment on controlee self-control
via the promotion of clan control, we do not examine
the interplay among the three control modes. Future
research may examine how self-control interacts with
formal and/or clan control (Huber et al., 2013).
Second, this study is a response to a call by Wiener et
al. (2016) for studying control enactment. There is
much that we do not know about the effects of control
enactment on people and processes in complex
projects. Our study finds that control enactment effects
can be reinforced by controlee response. Positive
reinforcing effects occur when the controller
repeatedly enacts control in an enabling manner to
facilitate the development of controlees’ capacity and
motivation to succeed. As a result, controlees can
exercise self-control to respond to emergent situations
unspecified by formal control for benefiting both the
controller and the controlee (as observed in Project
Alpha). Formal control and controlee self-control are
like stone and mortar for building a wall. Once mortar
is used to fill irregular gaps in stone, a strong wall can
be built to withstand all elements. In contrast, negative
reinforcing effects occur when the controller enacts
control in an authoritative manner to reinforce
misunderstanding and mistrust to the point where
controlees’ motivation and capacity for achieving
success are depleted. As a result, controlees embrace
self-protective behaviors and exploit the situational
contingency-formal control gap for self-protection
only (as observed in Project Beta). This is like building
a wall using only stone. Without mortar, wind can blow
through the wall and the wall is not as stable. It would
be wrong to simply conclude that enacting control in
an enabling style is always desirable; however, just as
you need mortar to build a high wall, we believe an
enabling enactment is necessary for complex projects
because controlee initiative is a prerequisite for
success. Our study shows an enabling style allows
controlees to more accurately sense and flexibly
respond to emergent situations in complex projects
(Goh, Pan, & Zuo, 2013). Given the increasing
complexity of IT projects (e.g., IoT solutions),
enacting control in an enabling style is likely to be
necessary in more IT projects.
This study also highlights that controlees play an
essential role in the controller-controlee dynamic: one
cannot assume that controlees will behave in a wholly
expected way when a particular control is enacted by a
controller. This study demonstrates that although
controllers attempt to enact controls to ensure
controlees’ performance, controlees are not necessarily
driven toward behaviors beneficial to the overall
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project. Instead, they can be driven to defensive
behaviors, especially if their attention is narrowly
directed toward individual task performance (Parker &
Collins, 2010). This also supports the conjectured
association between authoritative enactment and
control distortion (i.e., controlees misunderstand
controller goals and/or means to achieve said goals)
proposed by Heumann et al. (2015) who say the
authoritative control style could lead to higher control
distortion because of the lack of transparency on the
use of control.
This study shows the importance of fostering a
collaborative culture to support controlee self-control
across the project team. In complex IT projects, tasks
are often interrelated and rely on collaboration for
completion of other tasks. Prior studies have argued for
the importance of norms of independence and
individualism for promoting controlee self-control
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Wiener et al., 2015).
However, the coexistence of independence and a
collaborative culture is not paradoxical, if we consider
that independence can be facilitated by collegial peers.
In Project Alpha, engineers could pursue challenging
goals because of peers who released more information
and adhered to agreed schedules to prevent bottlenecks.
Additionally, a collaborative culture is conducive for a
clear separation of role/responsibilities (i.e.,
independence) because expectations are articulated
and communicated. Finally, a collaborative culture
encourages controlees to forgo immediate, selfinterested behaviors in favor of acts based on broader
and long-term considerations. In Project Alpha,
engineers collaborated with designers to solve design
errors, instead of covering up the problems or pushing
them on to designers. A collaborative culture, in turn,
can be fostered by controllers showing respect for
expertise and facilitating information exchange.
Within Project Beta, an authoritative enactment caused
controlees to compete for resources (e.g., facilities)
and take refuge in defensive efforts, reinforcing
mistrust that was dysfunctional for self-control.
Finally, our research highlights the importance of
controlees’ capacity to work as an important
consideration in enacting control. Individual
controlees’ capacity to work is a limited resource
(Baumeister et al., 1998). The execution of self-goals
and self-monitoring requires controlees to tap into and
consume that capacity to work (Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000). Complex projects can quickly
deplete the capacity to work because of task
complexity and the need to switch mindsets in an
evolving context (Hamilton et al., 2011). In Project
Beta, merely complying with the demands of all
controls overstretched the engineers. This left them
with no energy to pursue goals beyond their narrow,
formal responsibilities. However, in Project Alpha,
extra support/resources and easy access to project

information helped increase/conserve engineers’
capacity. When permitted to adapt to the environment,
the engineers applied the excess capacity to align their
self-goals with the controller goals and self-monitor
their progress. Our case thus suggests that controlee
self-control may be stronger when controllers enact
control to conserve/replenish controlees’ capacity to
work.

5.4 Managerial Implications
Managers have been given advice on which control to
enact according to the characteristics of the context
(Kirsch, 1997; Nidumolu & Subramani, 2003).
However, we theorize that controlees play an essential
role in control enactment, and there is often a gap
between control and emerging situations in complex IT
projects. Controllers need to interact with controlees in
an enabling manner to facilitate controlee self-control
to close this gap. Our results demonstrate that an
enabling enactment helps enhance controlees’ capacity
and motivation for achieving success and addressing
emergent issues in complex projects. In return, the
enhanced capacity and motivation increases the
effectiveness of control enacted. The interplay
between control enacted and controlee self-control
contributes to superior outcomes of complex IT
projects.
A key question is: How does the controller start the
positive reinforcing effect of formal control enactment
to facilitate self-control or stop the negative
reinforcing effect once it begins? To get the controller
and controlee interacting to positively reinforce control
enactment, it may be useful to create opportunities for
interaction that go beyond command and control. For
example, controllers can regularly discuss emerging
situations with controlees and support individual and
collective problem solving. This makes both
controllers and controlees aware of the inadequacies of
formal control and allows formal control to structure
controlees’ work in a way that still enables the exercise
of self-control (Molnar, Nandhakumar, & Stacey,
2017). Moreover, while it is encouraging that the
controller can enact transparency and repair to
facilitate self-control, an ad hoc approach cannot be
expected to sustain the positive reinforcing effect or
reverse a negative one. It is the repeated controllercontrolee interaction that enables the controlee’s
accumulation of capacity and motivation for exercising
self-control.

5.5 Limitations
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First,
this study relies on retrospective accounts of new
product development projects. We addressed this
limitation by using multiple interviewees and by
collecting data within one month after the projects
were completed. We also collected time-stamped
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control documents for triangulation of interview data.
Second, we do not claim that self-control is the only
way to bridge situational contingency/formal control
gaps. Several studies have suggested that formal
control can be complemented by other factors, such as
boundary-spanning activities (Gopal & Gosain, 2010),
trust (Das & Teng, 1998), or group norms and
individual reputation (Gallivan, 2001). More research
should be done to identify the processes through which
formal control can be complemented to improve
project outcomes. Third, this study is based on a
relatively small number of cases in a specific context.
However, while our research may not be generalizable
to a larger population, it is likely generalizable to
theory (i.e., the process model in Figure 5) (Lee &
Baskerville, 2003).

6

Conclusion

Formal control cannot be sufficiently prespecified for
controlling complex IT projects. Controlee self-control
is needed to address unanticipated issues. This research
explores the enactment of a formal control (i.e., a
checklist) on two complex IT projects in a wireless
manufacturing organization. We found that how a
control is enacted is critical to understanding whether
controlee self-control will emerge to bridge the gap
between the initial control and emerging situations.
The key finding is that an enabling enactment
facilitates controlee self-control by creating a safe
space and a trusting/collaborative culture for
independent actions of benefit to the overall project. In
contrast, an authoritative enactment induces
dysfunctional behaviors among controlees who seek to
exploit the gap for their own protection. Repeated
controller-controlee interaction contributes to the
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reinforcing effects of control enactment on project
outcomes.
Finally, one could argue that controllers may adopt
different control styles toward different controlee
groups within a project (e.g., designer vs. engineer)
(Soh, Chua, & Singh, 2010). This might be true.
However, the focus is on how the control style shapes
controlee behavior. This study suggests that controller
behaviors predispose controlees to behave in a
particular way. Future studies may be carried out to
examine the interaction between the controller and
different controlee groups.
One could also argue that the superior outcomes of
Project Alpha arose from differences in controller
seniority (senior technical manager) and/or client
relationship (new client), because the senior controller
had more power to enact effective control and the new
client would attract more controller attention. However,
based on the results of this study, project outcomes are
not necessarily associated with the actual resources
commanded by the controller (e.g., power, time,
workforce). In Project Beta, regardless of a relaxed
schedule and workforce (7 weeks and 9 engineers vs.
4 weeks and 7 engineers in Project Alpha), the
controller chose to enact control authoritatively and
invested energy/time blocking information flow and
scrutinized controlees to the point that resources were
exhausted and mistrust was reinforced, leading to
below-par project performance. The importance of the
structural condition is somewhat unclear. This
suggests that additional studies in which control is
enacted by controllers having a similar power status
would be helpful.

The Reinforcing Effects of Formal Control Enactment
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Appendix
Table A1. Interaction Surrounding Control Enacted
Category

Empirical evidence

Project Alpha
E1

E2

Controller
•
transparency
•
built communication channels
•
removed impediments

•

Controlee
•
understood controller goals
•
self-monitored

•
•

Understood controller goals (i.e., product auditing)
Used the MRR to acquire product information from designers &
started to analyze the product early

Controller

•

Allowed individual interpretation/adaptation of the MRR to settle
disputes/problems

Controlee
•
set self-goals
•
self-monitored

•

Interpreted, applied, and amended the MRR as considered
appropriate to situational contingencies
Applied the MRR to identify/analyze design problems

Controller
•
repair: relaxed controls
•
facilitated collaboration

•
•

Relaxed other formal controls (e.g., tolerance for deviations)
Fostered norms to facilitate collaboration (e.g., respect for
expertise, punctuality, information sharing)

Controlee
•
set challenging self-goals
•
self-monitored
•
conserved personal resources
•
developed intrinsic motivation:
perceived competence

•
•
•
•

Collaborated with others to pursue challenging goals
Monitored/solved problems unspecified by the MRR
Used the MRR to memorize details & expedite routine checks
Felt competent at design auditing

Controller
•
did not remove impediments
•
hid information

•

Accepted structural constraints as given (e.g., designer
domination, other controls)
Did not expose engineers to MRR-relevant information

Controlee
•
lacked behavioral change

•

Were confused about the MRR (i.e., means-ends relationship)
and persisted with behavioral patterns that were ineffective for
product auditing

Controller
•
used commands to control
•
imposed interpretation

•
•

Issued commands and demanded responses
Disallowed individual interpretation of the MRR regardless of
situational contingencies

Controlee
•
worked around control
•
monitored by others

•
•

Disagreed over responsibilities and performed tasks perfunctorily
Relied on the product engineer for guidance and evaluation

Controller
•
mechanically applied control

•

Mechanically applied the MRR and punished engineers for what
they had little influence on

Controlee
•
developed extrinsic motivation
•
depleted capacity
•
a self-protective culture emerged

•
•
•

Applied the MRR to avoid blame or waive responsibilities
Applied limited energy to respond to frequent review requests
Mistrusted peers (e.g., designers)

•

E3

•
•

repair: allowed independent
action

•

Set up a shared server for disseminating project- and MRR
information (with tasks’ temporal connection emphasized)
Discussed the MRR (goals/means/history) with engineers in
meetings
Negotiated with other controllers to remove designer oppression
and reschedule other projects

Project Beta
E1

E2

E3

•
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